PREPARED STATEMENT

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. I also want to congratulate you and your staff for your decision to hold these Hearings at this time. It is a privilege for me, as well as for my colleagues on this panel, to have this opportunity to discuss with you the current state of transatlantic relations and where this vital relationship may be heading in the future.

Your letter, Mr. Chairman, raised several significant issues that grow logically out of the stormy debate that divided Americans and Europeans during the months that preceded the use of force in Iraq. I would like to regroup these issues around three main questions.

- **How serious is the current crisis?**

Is it merely another dispute over a single area of disagreement? Can it be reduced to a simple bilateral clash, especially with France, or to a confrontation with a small group of allegedly old European countries that are or can be readily isolated from the rest of the continent? Or could this crisis point to a deeper and wider cleavage between the two sides of the Atlantic and their respective roles in the world?

- **Assuming such a crisis to be serious, how significant is it?**

Do we need to worry about it—and should we, as Americans, fear that in a post-Cold War security environment, additionally transformed by the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, new instabilities will not be managed in the absence and at the expense of our like-minded allies and friends across the Atlantic? Or can we conclude instead that such a new security environment calls for a more fluid multilateral structure than the institutional architecture developed during and for the Cold War—a new multilateralism based on multiple coalitions of the willing, the capable, and the relevant for preempting the "new normalcy" of global terror inaugurated by 9/11?

- **Assuming the crisis to be both serious and significant, how reversible is it?**

In other words, does the Atlantic Alliance now lie in rubble, notwithstanding the generally soothing tones heard at the G8 Summit held in Evian, France, earlier this month—and, equally important, are Europe and its Union now facing genuine risks of a divide that might end the process of European unification in a transatlantic context at the very moment when these processes seemed to be reaching finality? And assuming reversibility, what can be done in the short and long term to heal the wounds between

heads of state and government, repair current institutional damage, and best ensure that the historically daunting vision launched by President Truman after World War II, and sustained by every single U.S. president during and since the end of the Cold War, can not only endure but also come to full completion?

Is it serious?

There should be little doubt that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have been significant institutional casualties of the war in Iraq. European heads of state and government who joined the coalition of the willing organized by President George W. Bush (with a decisive assist from Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as Prime Minister José Maria Aznar and President Aleksander Kwasniewski) often did so in spite of significant opposition from their general public. States that gathered, vocally or passively, in the coalition of the unwilling organized by President Jacques Chirac (with a decisive assist from Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, as well as President Vladimir Putin) did so at the expense of a Euro-Atlantic structure within which the states of Europe have gained unprecedented security, stability, and prosperity. With the end of the U.S.-led coalition's combat operations in Iraq, there appears to be renewed ambivalence in the United States about the condition and usefulness of these institutions. According to some, the EU is a troubled and troubling union: troubled in terms of its internal divisions, and troubling in terms of the motivation that seems to underline the actions of its older members. According to others (often the same), NATO is a fading Organization with a blocking minority of members that are not only unwilling but also broadly incapable and frankly irrelevant.

We should be under no illusions. The most recent transatlantic debate, if that is the appropriate word, occurred on top of an ongoing debate that began in Europe after the end of the Cold War, but was accelerated after September 11 (9/11) in the United States. That debate confirmed that Americans and Europeans now move in two different time zones. While the European side of the Atlantic still celebrates the close of a century of total wars, which was welcomed on November 11, 1989, Americans prepare for a new century of global conflicts, which opened on September 11, 2001. Thus, we as Americans may read the time as half past NATO, because of the successful pacification of most of the European continent since 1949, and the related imperative to turn our attention and energies to the ugly Hobbesian world that still prevails elsewhere. But "they" as Europeans can read the time as half before the EU, because of the unfinished nature of Europe's unification within the newly discovered Kantian environment within which Europe now evolves.

Mr. Chairman, what makes the current divide so very serious is the fact that it is between the United States as a whole and the whole of Europe. For Europe to believe that post-9/11 America is a passing phenomenon best explained with partisan references to the person of the president and a so-called neo-conservative philosophy, is to misrepresent the nation's mood and its collective determination to wage battle against the criminal forces that made that ghastly day possible. Alternatively, for Americans to believe that the current divide can be limited to a single state, or that it can be reduced to

a single issue, or that it can be confined to a single moment is equally misleading and even dangerously complacent.

• The current crisis is not a bilateral clash with one country intent on containing U.S. influence in and beyond Europe by organizing an ad hoc coalition of the unwilling for a new multipolar world. This, in other words, had nothing to do with the *déjà vu* of past quarrels between the United States and France, or even the *déjà dit* of French resistance to a unipolar world. Even as a near majority of heads of state and government in Europe sided with America during the pre-war months, through the so-called Letter of Eight and the Vilnus Letter, President Jacques Chirac could legitimately claim that France, together with Germany and Russia, was in fact speaking for the Europeans. Thus, by March 2003, the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed an overwhelming public opposition to the war in Iraq, even in such key allies as Poland (73 percent) and Italy and Spain (81 percent). Victory in Iraq hardly helped. Indeed, the reverse seems to be true as a 44-nations survey released by Pew earlier this month uncovered that the U.S. image has tumbled further in nearly every country for which benchmark measures are available.

Coming only 20 months after a spontaneous display of "complete solidarity" over the events of September 11, this surge of near total public hostility and mistrust is cause for concern. This is not anti-Americanism as usual—so predictable and nearly Pavlovian as to make it frankly boring. Mr. Chairman, this plummeting of the American image in 2002 and into the current year suggests a serious failure of public diplomacy that must be addressed urgently, especially as the many questions now raised about the conditions that made war necessary threaten to harm even further not only the American image in Europe and elsewhere but also the political standing of our closest allies and friends everywhere.

• Nor is this crisis limited to Iraq: indeed, putting aside Iraq we would still be facing a critical juncture within both the Atlantic Alliance and with the EU—though without the passion shown over the past 12 years by repeated transatlantic and intra-European debates about regime change in Iraq.

In effect, the debate is more broadly focused on the kind of international order that can be built not only with predominant American power, acknowledged in Europe to be clearly necessary, and occasionally decisive, but also in spite and without that power. The risk for the United States, then, is to misunderstand the follower-ship of a number of European countries this spring as a broader agreement over all kinds of other pressing foreign policy and security issues for which intra-European differences may be actually lesser than transatlantic differences. In recent weeks and during the coming months, for example, pursuit of the road map in the Middle East, an enhanced UN role for Iraq, the containment of Iran, and the disarming of North Korea may shape a "European" agenda about which Britain's views (or those of Spain, Poland, or Italy) would parallel the positions maintained in Paris and Berlin (though not necessarily incompatible with the views held in Washington).

• Because of its broad dimensions, the crisis is, therefore, also bound to last for some time. Admittedly, the apparent end of combat operations in Iraq and abstention from any new imminent use of U.S. military power outside those areas where it is already engaged, the Bush administration's commitment to pursing the road map drafted by the Quartet for peace in the Middle East, and the muting of earlier threats of "punishment" for some of our more recalcitrant allies seem to point to a reprieve in Euro-American tensions. But that reprieve is unlikely to last. Sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, there will be another challenge from the allies—not necessarily military but in other spheres of trade, economics, or even cultural issues; not necessarily with France or Germany leading the way, but with others—even the likes of Great Britain, Spain, or Poland—whose decision to join our coalition of the willing in 2003 may not prove possible under different security or political conditions in 2004 and beyond.

Mr. Chairman, the challenge we face in the context of what has been learned over the past several months is not over the need to reassert our common values. That, I believe, was not in question. No one on either side of the Atlantic was prepared to argue that a change of regime in Iraq would not be better for that country and its people, as well as their immediate neighbors, the entire region, and indeed the world. Nor was anyone prepared to argue that a world without or with fewer weapons of mass destruction (WMD), wherever these might actually be stockpiled or developed would not be preferable. As President Bush affirmed in his eloquent speech of May 30 in Krakow, "the whole civilized world has a stake in this fight." The challenge is to think of ways in which the transatlantic community of values that emerged over the past 50 years can be transformed into a community of action whenever these values are recognized to be at risk. Whether in a Euro-Atlantic or an intra-European context, within NATO or within the EU, no such common action could be taken in the case of Iraq. That was a serious failure.

Does it matter?

Outside Iraq, the current transatlantic crisis impacts two areas especially significant for the United States—its interests, its values, and its security:

• The unparalleled depth of U.S. economic interests in Europe, interests that cannot be protected, let alone enhanced, without an effective and cohesive European Union, and without effective relations between the EU and the United States, and

• The historic scope of the EU agenda, understood as an agenda designed to complete the process of integration that was inspired by visionary U.S. leadership more than 50 years ago, and has been pursued by persistent European leaders ever since.

For allies who have been so successful together, and who have grown such intimacy with each other, Americans and Europeans still fail to understand each other well, especially when it seems to matter most. For Americans, the institutional setting within which the countries of Europe now live is especially puzzling, not only because it remains incomplete but because its final chapters remain unpredictable—"the half-imagined, half-written page" evoked by William Butler Yeats in his postwar poem,

"Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" that helps remember how much of Europe's history has been rewritten during the intervening years. In short, post-wars Europe remains a difficult partner to understand, address, and even use.

Not enough Americans truly appreciate the enormity of what has been achieved in and by Europe since the Rome Treaties were signed in 1957 by a few states that had themselves no explicit vision for the future—beyond the elusive goal of an "ever closer union." There is nothing old in the new Europe. As I stated in an earlier testimony for this Subcommittee two years ago, on April 25, 2001, Europe is now completing its third territorial revolution in half a millennium: at first, there were the city states; then, came the nation-states; and now, here are the member-states—elusive political units that attempt to accommodate the collective discipline imposed upon them by the institutions to which they belong, with the national sovereignty to which they continue to aspire nonetheless. While completing this territorial revolution, three to five hundred million Europeans are doing in their own habitat what a few hundred thousands of them set out to do, and did, on this side of the Atlantic more than 200 years ago.

Not the least of my concerns is that recent tensions within Europe, often reinforced by some members' legitimate exasperation with Franco-German exaggerated claims of dominance over the EU agenda, have complicated Europe's quest for the so-called finality of its institutional construction. Looming ahead is a political civil war among states that will be more reluctant to make the various trade-offs needed to agree on a constitution, to enforce fair terms of enlargement after the 10 new members have assumed their legitimate place at the EU table, to complete the euro-zone and proceed with economic union, and to live with the consequences of their proclaimed commitment to a common foreign, security, and (ultimately) defense policy. But looming ahead, too, are domestic political battles that will have to be waged within many of these countries where public opinion may not be ready to accept the intrusive consequences of the decisions taken by their governments without prior acquiescence from their national constituencies. In both of these areas—intergovernmental trade-offs and public support—the constitutional debate promises to be especially tense, and its consequences may prove to be especially significant as any referendum on a European constitution would be in act a referendum over continued membership in the Union.

Mr. Chairman, I worry about the state of the (European) Union in the context of our transatlantic partnership with Europe because not only is the idea of a territorial consolidation of Europe an American idea, it is also an idea that has served U.S. interests well. There, across the Atlantic, now lies a continent where we should and can feel at home at last. But there, across the Atlantic, also lies a continent in which we can live well because there more than anywhere else outside North America our policies have had tangible benefits. The invisible tunnel that links the Old and the New World is paved with the $2,500 billion worth of yearly commercial transactions that now entangle nearly every one of the 50 states of our Union with each of the 15 current states of the European Union (not to mention the ten candidate states scheduled to join in 2004). How well we have done with each other is measured even more concretely by the entangling network of corporate interests that bridge the two sides of the Atlantic—a virtual state populated

by thousands of U.S. firms in Europe, and European firms in the United States, with a labor force of nearly 7.5 million and a gross national product of about $1,300 billion a year, the total yearly output, that is, of these companies that for the most part did not exist a mere 50 years ago. Legislated sanctions from one side of the Atlantic against the other are no longer possible because the consequences of these sanctions are no longer divisible, no less across the Atlantic than within Europe. Economic harm to France and Germany, for example, is likely to cause harm on the rest of Europe, but harm on Europe is also likely to cause harm in the United States.

On most economic matters already, including but not limited to trade, we deal with Europe as a single entity, and the EU has already emerged as the virtual sixteenth member of the union. The challenge for America is to use this potential counterweight as an effective counterpart—to rely on the EU's economic strength and political influence in ways that are of benefit to all of us, Americans and Europeans. A counterweight need not be intrinsically adversarial, and with a transatlantic will to cooperate, on trade and other economic issues, there is little that cannot be accomplished, as was shown in successive rounds of trade negotiations and as should be shown for the current Doha round during which the efforts of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick have been especially impressive and will hopefully be met with the needed responses from his EU counterpart Pascal Lamy, in order to meet the Doha agenda on schedule in January 2005.

On foreign policy and security issues, however, there is no plausible alternative to dealing with individual EU countries, or ad hoc groupings of EU members. In early 2003, neither the Blair-Aznar nor the Chirac-Schroeder positions would have gained majority support within the EU by the standards of governance set at the Nice summit in December 2001 (or, most likely, by the standards of governance that President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wants to introduce in the constitutional draft he will propose at the EU Summit later this month). Dealing with individual European states is not an American choice, allegedly aimed at dividing the EU in order to reinforce U.S. influence in Europe. This condition is a European reality, based on Europe's own inability to agree on significant foreign policy issues, about which they are unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty, whether within the EU or relative to the United States. Now as before, the larger EU countries, too, favor direct bilateral ties with the United States on most non-commercial matters. If anything, the trend was confirmed during the recent debate over Iraq. In the fall 2002, the French government came close to achieving an unprecedented status within the alliance. That it would have chosen to move in different directions after adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1441 would require separate analysis. Suffice it to say that by overplaying a weak hand, France did much damage to itself within Europe, a damage that Europeans themselves will now have to mend. But it also did much damage to the transatlantic partnership that President Bush began to heal during his successful trip earlier this month.

There should be no misunderstanding: the EU has become a central, indeed irreplaceable part of its members' future, including all the leading members of the so-called "new Europe." Occasional suggestions that some of its members, including Britain, should be invited to join the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA),

or that the EU might split into sub-unions, as used to be the case when a Franco-German-led European Economic Community (EEC) co-existed with a UK-led European Free Trade Association (EFTA), are politically dogmatic and historically absurd. More importantly, should these suggestions nevertheless come to pass they would profoundly harm the interests of the United States as well as those of all of Europe.

Mr. Chairman, we must expose and end once and for all suggestions that the U.S. goal is to divide Europe, and if there is any such temptation, it should be contained and reversed. That has never been the case in the past, and need not be the case now. Voices that have articulated this view are often unauthorized views that have no echo in the administration—whether this administration or any of those that preceded it from either political party. American officials need to be better represented at significant public discussions of the transatlantic partnership to debate and deny such allegations. Anti-Americanism in Europe has become far too often dependent on the rhetorical provocations of America's own version of anti-Europeanism, provocations that reduce Europe and some of its most important countries to a caricature of what they used to be, are, or hope to become. An increasingly united, institutionally coherent, and progressively stronger European Union is an important U.S. interest not only because the EU is vital to its members but also because it is essential to the preservation and enhancement of our own interests. Forcing any European country to choose between "old" states within the EU and the United States within NATO will not produce the expected results, and even if it did, the outcome would be self-defeating, as it would mean the end of the EU without any plausible alternative to replace it.

In sum, the end of the Cold War in November 1989, and the start of the wars against global terrorism in September 2001, have created many new realities, alerted us to many new dangers, and opened us to many new tensions. But they have not changed our central aspirations for an ever-closer Europe and ever more cohesive transatlantic relations in and beyond Europe. That there would be some ambivalence about this conclusion confirms how serious the recent crisis has been and remains. But is the damage it has caused reversible? And if so, how?

Is it reversible?

Admittedly, these lofty goals are endangered by the severity of the wounds suffered by the two institutions that best define the unity achieved in the West during the Cold War. Yet, however severe these wounds are, they need not be fatal. In other words, announcements of an impending death of NATO or of the EU, let alone of both, are exaggerated, deceptive, and frankly counterproductive to U.S. interests and values.

That these institutional wounds can be cured is not a conclusion complacently based on the knowledge that the many other such moments faced in the past were readily overcome, and occasionally helped create more energy within Europe and more synergies between Europe and the United States. All too regretfully, some pessimism in 2003 can be healthy and even constructive: To mend the rift and renew the Alliance, we will need more than a telephone call or two, like those made by Chirac and accepted by Bush; more

than an eloquent speech, like the President's speech in Krakow on May 30; more than a moderately successful Summit, like the Evian Summit of June 1-3; and even more than a few concession speeches, like those heard at the UN when ending the sanctions against Iraq late last month.

Rather, we need to reassert our commitment, on both sides of the Atlantic and in all parts of Europe, to the agenda of renewal and finality that was endorsed by all heads of states and government at the NATO and EU Summits held in Prague and Copenhagen late last year: in November 2002, when all NATO members endorsed blueprints for a cohesive and united organization at 26 members, ready to acquire the needed capabilities and make the required reforms to reassert its relevance to the global conflicts of the twenty-first century; and in December 2002, when all EU countries reaffirmed their commitment to a dynamic and stronger EU prepared for a constitutional convention in anticipation of its impending enlargement to 10 new countries.

That the U.S. strategic vision of the world was transformed on September 11, 2001 is amply justifiable. Most Europeans and a large number of their governments still fail to understand fully the impact of 9/11 on and in the United States. For most Americans, this was neither terror nor war as usual. Bringing the "over there" of war "over here" in continental America threatened to introduce a condition of vulnerability that may be compatible with the ways of European history but is not reflective of the American way. Unprecedented (though not exclusive) emphasis was therefore placed in the United States on military power, including its pre-emptive use in the aftermath of the "smoking gun" that had been uncovered that day in New York City and Washington.

However understandable that emphasis is, relying on the restored primacy of military power for the denigration of a "weak" Europe is a flawed and self-defeating argument. By any standard other than military standards, Europe is indeed powerful—and in some areas of economic and soft power the equal of American power. In short, a more relevant dichotomy than "power and weakness" must therefore distinguish between power and order: however necessary military power is for security, it is not sufficient for order and stability.

For many Americans, Europe's neglect of military power, even as an escape from its past history of divisions and violence, seeks to appease the current threats and thus reinforces the risks that loom ahead. For many Europeans, the U.S. emphasis on power, even in the aftermath of September 11, seems so exclusive as to neglect the deeper causes of the threats that the use of force is designed to prevent or preempt. Because neither perspective is entirely wrong, neither perspective is entirely right either. Herein lies America's need for Europe—and Europe's need for America. This is not an argument for a division of labor that implies a rigidity that neither side could welcome for long. The case for complementarity within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as between its members and their institutions, is based on a new arithmetic of additions and subtractions rather than on the worn out arithmetic of divisions: what each ally does is added to what others do, but can also reduce what any one ally must otherwise do on its own.

Complementarity begins, therefore, with an agreement over the legitimacy of our differences—what Prime Minister Blair called, in a recent speech in Warsaw, the difference between "subservience and rivalry." There is no *single* U.S.-European interest—nor even a single European interest—on all matters, but interests can still be held in common even when they are not evenly shared. *Common* interests demand an action that can remain united even when the policies that shape that action are pursued only in parallel. In other words, the United States and the states of Europe cannot be expected to take on everything together, but together it must be expected that they can and will attend to everything. In this context, U.S.-EU cooperation to reach a settlement in Cyprus is a case in point.

Admittedly, to become a complete security partner, Europe will have to become militarily capable—a condition that may remain beyond reach so long as most of its members (except Britain and, to an extent, France) fail to spend more, and so long as all of them fail to make the institutional adjustments needed to spend better. Unless Europe spends more and spends better, the many gaps that separate them from each other as well as from the United States will continue to expand: capabilities gaps, technology gaps, governance gaps, policy gaps, credibility gaps, and much more. In other words, while the crisis in Iraq has confirmed that divisions within the Alliance breed divisions within Europe, there cannot be more unity between the United States and Europe without more unity within Europe. Achieving the latter is not a U.S. responsibility, even though on occasion the United States has been given responsibility for instigating some of the divisions within Europe—whether appropriately or not. But beyond military power alone, the toolbox needed for both security and stability must be kept full enough to avoid war, wage it as a matter of last resort, win it at the least possible cost, and end it after it has been won.

Whether the United States has enough military power to start and win wars on its own terms is beyond doubt; but that power alone may no longer be enough to prevent or even contain these wars. Moreover, because the tools of reconstruction and rehabilitation needed to end wars do not "belong" to the executive branch to the same extent as the tools needed for liberation, the United States must rely on significant contributions from allies and friends after the war has been won—to achieve pacification, initiate reconstruction, and pursue rehabilitation of the liberated state. Nor can the United States attend to these tasks with one European country, or a hand-picked coalition of willing European countries, more effectively than with most European members and the institutions to which they belong or which they hope to join.

An Agenda for Action

To work out the terms of complementarity will not be easy. A shared political willingness may be lacking. Assuming that there is shared willingness, capabilities may also be lacking, or they may be so far out of balance as to make inter- or co-operability in the military and other areas difficult. Finally, assuming capabilities, time may be lacking—time, that is, to recover from the recent wounds and launch an agenda that would permit America and Europe to renew, retool, and define their new partnership for the twenty-

first century. Still, a few items could readily find their way into a constructive agenda without too much time-consuming debate and on the basis of capabilities that are currently available.

Thus, even as European countries attend to their daunting institutional agenda, more should be done to reassure Americans that they will continue to feel at home in Europe. Too much of what is achieved in the EU context is presented by some as evidence of Europe's new ability to challenge the United States. Power is in the hands of the beholder: there is nothing intrinsically wrong about a unipolar world, as some in Europe insist, but there is nothing intrinsically wrong about a multipolar world, as some in the United States seem to assume. That such is not the case, and that Europe's added weight can reinforce its stature as a partner of choice for the United States (whose dominant weight certainly served Europe well in the past) deserves explanations that NGOs can demonstrate on the field, and think tanks can provide far from the field, especially well. More directly, at the ongoing European Convention, at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and with parliamentarians for appropriate issues and at appropriate levels, U.S. representatives should have the opportunity to observe proceedings and debates—not to participate and to influence, but to hear and to be influenced by their peers' debates, as well as share with them their reactions and even their preferences.

The issue is not one of U.S. membership in the EU or any of its distinctive institutional bodies, but one of association, dialogue, and cooperation before decisions are reached. At some point over the next five years, a mechanism should be adopted that allows more direct consultation between the United States and the institutional bodies of the EU. The current format of transatlantic (U.S.-EU) summit meetings does not satisfy that need. These meetings should help provide strategic direction and political momentum, rather than focus on insignificant points of commercial concern and political representation. All in all, the states of Europe should leave less doubt about their intention to build with their partner across the Atlantic the same intimacy that the United States built with the states of Europe within NATO—including, ultimately, some sort of a treaty that would be sought when both sides are ready for a transatlantic vision that was best articulated by President John F. Kennedy in July 1962.

Meanwhile, even as America intensifies its efforts for a more effective public diplomacy in Europe, Europeans, grouped around their institutions, should improve their public dialogue in the United States. For too many Americans, the EU comes up primarily to describe barriers to U.S. exporters, obstacles to U.S. foreign direct investment, unfair competition for U.S. companies, offensive critics of U.S. values, and persistent rivals to U.S. interests. In short, the EU is mainly heard and understood as a dirty, anti-American word. Instead, the American public should gain better exposure to the extraordinary achievements written into the development of the EU. That Europe today would be more united, as well as more peaceful, more democratic and more affluent than at any time in history is a tribute to the work and vision of past leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. For the benefits of such achievements to be enjoyed by

Americans and Europeans alike, and spread to others around the world as well, will require close cooperation between the United States and the EU.

To this effect, plans should be made for a joint summit meeting of countries that currently belong to, or are about to enter, both of the institutions that together form the architecture of our Euro-Atlantic community. That meeting, which could be held as early as the spring of 2004, in the dual context of the NATO and EU enlargement to the east, would envision further steps to achieve a Euro-Atlantic finality that would be celebrated in March 2007, for the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaties. At both of these summits Americans and Europeans should reassert a vigorous and credible commitment to common projects based on the values they share to such an extent that there can be no debate over the desirability of a common—and even single—transatlantic policy. Curing AIDS and controlling infectious diseases are certainly goals worthy of the civilization we share: what was said in Evian had been said before, but this time at last it should not be left undone for lack of will or lack of commitment. Coordinating aid and humanitarian assistance, and even agreeing on some general rules that might condition the distribution of that aid, should not be beyond the reach of the feasible.

In coming months, too, every effort should be made to enforce the agenda developed at the Prague summit of November 2002, for the renewal and reorganization of NATO. The Bush administration did not receive enough credit for the Summit, which should have been understood as the reaffirmation of its commitment to the multilateral institutions inherited from the Cold War. Nor did Canada and the 17 European members (plus the new seven candidate countries) receive the credit they deserved for their endorsement of the U.S.-driven agenda. Part of that credit should take the form of a renewed U.S. effort to permit the development of an integrated transatlantic defense market: in this area especially, there has been far too much talk and much too little action as the risks of two defense fortresses have grown rather than receded in recent years.

As reflective of this shared transatlantic commitment to an alliance that would now have a global reach, NATO should be called upon to play a more important peacekeeping role in Iraq—and, when the time comes, NATO could also be a significant feature of the guarantees that will have to accompany the final enforcement of the road map calling for a Palestinian state within three years. In this context, the Quartet is a potentially useful tool that enables the United States to avoid some of the difficulties inherent in the bilateral management of European allies, but also enables the allies to exert influence, short of a veto right, as a sort of collective counterpart on issues about which they agree more among themselves than with the United States. The inclusion of Russia in the Quartet, together with the global legitimacy brought by the United Nations (UN), adds further weight to balance the United States—without, however, truly diluting the fact that the United States and the EU remain the operational core of the Quartet. In short, for some of the most pressing issues of the moment, the Quartet can be viewed as a multilateral venue that avoids an unwanted dependence on the institutional insufficiencies of the UN, NATO, and the EU.

Finally, none of these suggestions, among many others, will be manageable without an improvement in significant bilateral relations between the United States and some of the states of Europe, but also among European states. Whatever causes for disappointment and even anger, the goal is not to punish but to engage, not to divide but to unite, not to forget but to forgive. "Most history is guessing, and the rest is prejudice" wrote Will and Ariel Durant in their monumental *Story of Civilization*. Mr. Chairman, I do confess to a prejudice, which is to view the development of U.S. policies in Europe as the most successful American foreign policy since World War II. That prejudice, but also the analytical background I attempted to provide in this short statement, are enough to convince me that the Atlantic Alliance is the basis of an indispensable partnership between North America and the states of Europe.

That same "prejudice" but also recollections of the extraordinary transformation of Europe and its relations with America over the past 50 years, are also enough to convince me that, notwithstanding the tensions and bitterness of the past few months, the "West" is alive though ailing, and dynamic though weary. What is needed, therefore, is more, not less, integration so that our Western community of values and interests can be translated into a renewed community of action. Among themselves as a mutually shared right of first refusal, but also with new associates and partners, the members of the Alliance should be able to agree on some immediate priorities and certain key principles on how to define and counter these new threats. The ability to do so will define not only the rest of our lives, but possibly the lives of our children as well. It will also determine whether the ideas of European and transatlantic integration, which were launched along two parallel paths after World War II, and were refined—deepened and widened—throughout and since the Cold War, can now be completed by and between the United States and the states of Europe for the twenty-first century.